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674 HAIGLER V. DONNELLY. [18 C. (2d) 
[L. A. No. 17916. In Bank.-Oct. 1, 1941.] 
C. F. HAIGLER et al., Respondents, v. DOTTIE DELPHY 
DONNELLY et al., Appellants. 
[1] Brokers-Duties and ; Liabilities-Actions-Findings-Implied 
Findings.-A finding that a broker, while acting as agent, 
received a sum of money belonging to the principal for which 
he failed to account, includes by implication a finding that 
the transaction was consummated under the original listing 
of the property and that the broker was not therefore entitled 
to the reasonable value of his services. 
[2] Trial-Findings-Implied Findings-Negative Findings.-A 
trial court need not make an express finding upon an issue 
if it is implicit in the findings made. Nor is there any neces-
sity expressly to negate contradictory allegations. 
[3] :arokers-Compensation-Rate and Amount-Commission& in 
Excess of Fixed Price.-If a broker's contract for the salld or 
lease of. property ~esa net amount to be paid the owner, 
the broker's compensation is limited to the excess of the Pll.Y- . 
ment by the purchaser over the net specified. If he fails to -' 
sell or lease for more than the amount named, he is entitl~d 
to no compensation. 
[4] Id.-Compensation-Evidence-Modification of Sale Contract 
-Sale Under Original Listing.-An implied finding that a 
sale and lease were negotiated by a. broker under the original 
listing providing for a net amount to be paid the client was 
supported by testimony that during the negotiations nothing 
was said. concerning a commission, that the client had not 
authorized the broker to cancel the original agreement, and 
that the original listing card was used by the broker in nego-
tiating the transaction. 
. [5] Id.-Compensation - Construction of Contract - Authoriza-
tion to Retain Money.-A provision whereby a client agrees 
that money collected by a broker shall be retained to pay the 
, (;ell~r~s cOplm;ission and that the balance shall be paid by the 
2. See 24 Cal. Jur. 974, 976;.26 R. C. L. 1092. 
a See 4 Cal. Jur. 615; 8 Am. Jur. 1070. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Brokers, § 46; 2. Trial, §§ 337, 338; 
3, 6. Brokers, § 123; 4. Brokers, § 147 (13); 5. Brokers, § 53; 7. 
Damages, § 136; 8. Trover and Conversion, § 49; 9. Trover and 
, cJonversion, § 27; 10. Brokers, § 44; 11. Brokers, § 40; 12. Trover 
and Conversion, § 3; 13. Brokers, § 47. 
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broker to a designated party, is not an agreement to pay 
a commission, but simply all authorization to retain commis-
sions due. 
[6] Id.-Compensation_Rate and Amount-Commissions in Ex-
cess of Fixed Price-Effect of Consent to Sale Under Different 
Terms.-A client Who consents to a lease and sale under terms 
different from those set forth in a net listing does not thereby 
waive the conditions therein for the payment of a commission, 
and thereby become liable under an implied contract to pay 
the reasonable value of the services rendered in finding a pur-chaser. 
[7] DamageS-Exemplary Damages-In Contract Actions.-Under 
Civ. Code, § 3294, exemplary damages may not be recovered 
in an action based upon a contractual obligation, even though 
the breach of contract is wilful or malicious. But if the 
action is in tort such damages may be recovered upon a proper 
Showing of malice, fraud or oppression, even though the tort 
incidentally involves a breach of contract. There is a ques-
tion whether such damages can be recovered in an action for 
money had and received. 
[8] Trover and Conversion - Exemplary Damages. _ Exemplary 
damages are properly awardable in an action for conversion 
where there is a showing of malice, fraud or oppression. 
[9] Id.-Pleading - Complaints Held SUffiCient. _ A complaint 
charging the defendant with exercising dominion over prop-
erty inconsistent with the ownership of plaintiff sets forth a 
cause of action for conversion in the absence of a special 
demurrer for uncertainty. 
[10] Brokers-Duties and LiabilitieS-Pleading_Charge of Con-
version.-A complaint alleging that the defendant, while act-
ing as agent for the plaintiff, received a stipulated sum of 
money belonging to the plaintiff and refused to account for 
it after a proper demand, sufficiently charges conversion in 
the absence of a special demurrer for uncertainty . 
[11] Id. - Duties and Liabilities - Liability _ Conversion. _ .A 
broker or agent is ordinarily liable for convel'ting the funds 
of his principal when, he refuses to account for them upon 
proper dem~nd. 
[12] Trover and Conversion-Property Subject-MoneY.-While 
money cannot be the subject of an action for conversion un-
less a specific Sum capable of identification is' involved, it is 
not necessary that each coin or bill be earmarked. 
7. See 8 Cal. Jur. 872; 15 Am. Jur. 708. 
't 
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[13] Brokers -:- Duties and Liabilities - Damages _. Exemplary 
Damages - For Conversion. - Where a broker is guilty of 
conversion in refusing to account for a sum of money re-
ceived, and he withheld it, not in good faith under an honest 
belief that he was entitled thereto, but as the result of a 
fraudulent scheme to secure the client's money by means of 
trickery and deliberate falsehood, exemplary damages are 
properly awardable pursuant to Civ. Code, § 3294. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clement D. Nye, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against broker for money had and received and for 
conversion of money collected. Judgment for plaintiffs af-
firmed. 
. Henry S. Cohen and Bernard B. Cohen for Appellants. 
W. W. Comstock and H. A. Finkenstein for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs owned a furnished apartment 
house ill Los Angeles. In March, 1939, they listed the house 
and furniture with defendant, a licensed real estate broker, 
the house to be leased at $250 per month, the furniture to be 
sold for $3,000 cash, such· amounts to be net to plaintiffs. 
A listing card setting forth these terms was signed by plain-
tiffs and left in the possession of defendant. In April, 1939, 
plaintiffs gave to defendant another listing which authorized 
the sale of the apartment house and furniture for the lump 
sum of $27 ,000 with a five per cent commission to defendant. 
Thereafter, through defendant's offices Anna M. Silva agreed 
to lease the apartment house for a term of ten years at $250 
per month and to buy the furniture for $2500. Defendant 
communicated the terms to plaintiffs who accepted them and 
executed a written contract with Mrs. Silva on May 11, 1939. 
Mrs .. Silva paid $3500 to defendant, $2500 representing the 
price of the furniture and $1,000 representing payment on 
. account of; the lease. From the total sum defendant re-
blined, $1,150, which she claimed as commission, and ten-
dered topl~tintiffs a ~heck for $2,258.35, the balance of the 
amount paid less prorated rents in the sum of $91.65. Plain-
tiffs. demanded the full amount of $3408.35 and on being re-
fused undertook the present action. Prior to the filing of 
. ) 
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the complaint, plaintiffs accepted the check for $2,258.35 
under a stipulation that it could be cashed. without prejudice 
to the rights of either party. 
The complaint sets forth two causes of action. The first 
is for money had and received. The second, after incor-
porating the allegation of a demand contained in the first 
cause of action, alleges that defendant, as agent for plaintiffs, 
maliciously and fraudulently refused to account to plaintiffs 
for money belonging to plaintiffs which defendant had col-
lected on their account. Then follows a prayer for actual 
damages in the SUm of $3408.35 and for exemplary damages 
in the Sum of $3,000. The trial court found that defendant 
was not entitled to retain as commission the sum withheld 
by her and gave judgment for $3408.35 plus $500 as exem-
plary damages to plaintiffs. From this judgment, defend-
ant has appealed. 
Plaintiffs contend that under the original net listing de-
fendant was entitled to receive for her services only such 
amounts as she secured in excess of the net prices specified . 
Defendant contends that the original net listing was can-
celled and the listing card destroyed by her at the instance 
of plaintiffs at the time of the second listing. Since the 
lease and sale to Mrs. Silva were not within the terms of 
the second listing, which contemplated a lump Sum sale of 
both building and furniture, defendant bases her alleged 
dght to a commission upon the theory of an implied contract 
to pay the reasonable value of her services. She also claims 
a commission on the basis of an oral contract assertedly 
entered into between her and plaintiffs shortly before the deal 
with Mrs. Silva was closed. 
[1] Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the findings, 
citing in particular the failure of the trial Court to find 
whether or not she was entitled to the reasonable value of her 
services. Following the language of the pleadings, the trial 
court found that defendant, while acting as agent for plain-
tiffs, received the SUm of $3408.35 belonging to them for 
which she did not account. This finding of ultimate fact 
includes by necessary implication a finding that the transac-
tion was consummated under the original net listing and that 
defendant therefore was not entitled to the reasonable value 
of her services. [2] There i3 no error in the failure of the 
I,' 
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trial court to, make an express finding upon an issue if it is 
implicit in the findings made, and there is no necessity ex-
pressly to negate contradictory allegations. (See cases cited 
in 24 Cal. Jur. 974, 976.) 
, [3]. If,.a broker's contract for the sale or lease of prop-' 
e,rty fixes a net amount to be paid the owner, the broker's 
compensation is limited to the excess of the payment by the 
purchaser over the net amount specified. If he fails to sell 
o:rleasefor: more than, the amount named, the broker is en-
titled to no compensation. (Ford v. Brown, 120 Cal. 551 
[52 ,Pac. 817]; S~1l v. Oeschi, 167 Cal. 698 [140 Pac. 949] ; 
Ohurch v. Dunham, 14 Ida. 776 [96 Pac. 203] ; Burnett v. 
Potts, 236 Ill. 499 [86. N. E. 258] ; Oulbertson'v. Sheridan, 93 
Kan. 268 [144 Pac. 268] ; Futrell v. Reeves, 165 Ky. 282 [176 
S~ W. 1151] ; G~1more v. Bolio, 165 Mich. 633 [131 N. W. 105, 
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1050] ; Beatty v. Russell, 41 Neb. 321 [59 
N. W. 919] ; Wolverton v. Tuttle, 51 Ore. 501 [94 Pac. 9611 ; 
9 C. J. 581, 582.) [4] Therefore, if there is substantial evi-
dence to support the implied finding of the trial court that 
the sale and lease to Mrs. Silva were negotiated under the 
original net listing, defendant is not entitled to a commis-
sion. 
An examination of the record reveals ample evidence to 
support the finding. At the trial, plaintiff Haigler testified 
that during the negotiations with J\1rs. Silva nothing was said 
concerning a commission and that it was his understanding 
with defendant that the lease and sale would be governed by 
the original net listing. He denied authorizing the cancella-
tion of the .original agreement and the destruction of the 
card or making an oral contract to pay defendant a commis-
sion. He testified that Mrs. Brown, a saleswoman in the 
employ of. defendant, produced the listing card when the deal 
was closed but that defendant refused to show it to him. 
This testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Silva and her hus-
band, who were present at the time. Mrs. Brown also testi-
fied that the listing card was present at the time of the closing, 
of the deal with Mrs. Silva and had in fact been used by de-
fendant in negotiating the transaction. 
In support of her claim, defendant introduced in evidence 
a typewritten receipt admittedly signed by Mr. Haigler which 
read: "RECEIVED FROM DONNELLY & COMPANY the 
sum of Twenty~five hundred Dollars, above mentioned, Less 
~ 
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10% commission earned." Both Mr. and Mrs. Haigler testi-
fied that the words "Less 10%' commission earned" were not 
on the receipt at the time Mr. Haigler signed the writing. 
Mr. Sellers, a handWriting expert, testified that in his opin-
ion these words were typed at a different time and under 
different conditions from the . typewriting preceding them. 
Mr. and Mrs. Silva testified that defendant .had said to them 
ai different times that "she could do anything with them 
[plaintiffs] because they were dumb," and several witnesses 
testified that the reputation of defendant for truth and hon-
esty was bad. 
[5] In further support of an alleged agreement to pay 
her a commission, defendant refers to a provision in the con-
tract signed by plaintiffs with Mrs. Silva which reads: "It 
is hereby agreed that so much of said down payment, or any 
other money collected by Donnelly & Co., as is necessary shall 
be retained by Donnelly & Co., to pay the seller's commission 
and the balance if any, after said payment, shall be paid by 
said Donnelly & Co., to said party of the first part or held by 
agent subject to first parties order." This provision is not 
an agreement to pay a commission but simply an authoriza_ 
tion to retain commissions that may be due. 
[6] Defendant finally urges that plaintiffs, in consenting 
. to a lease and sale under terms different from those set forth 
in the net listing, waived the conditions therein for the pay-
ment of the commission and thereby became liable under an 
implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the services 
rendered by defendant in finding a purchaser. This conten-
tion is unsound. The parties were not prevented by the 
terms of the agreement from negotiating a sale at a reduced 
net price. Plaintiff's consent to a $500 reduction of the 
price of the furniture did not extinguish the agreement. 
Defendant has erroneously sought to invoke a rule applicable 
to a broker who undertakes to sell property under an agree-
ment whereby he is to receive as commission a certain per-
centage of the sale price obtained. In such a case a seller 
cannot defeat the right of a broker to his commission by Con-
summating a sale with the purchaser at a smaller price than 
that originally proposed. (Boland v. Ashurst Oil etc. 00., 
145 Cal. 405 [78 Pac. 871J; Wetzell v. Wagoner, 41 Mo. App. 
509; cases cited in 9 C. J. 600, 601.) These cases also recog-
nize, however, that the broker is not entitled to any recovery 
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if his right to a commission is conditional on a sale at the 
price mentioned in his authorization (see cases cited in 9 
C. J. 602). A broker under a net contract is entitled to no 
compensation unless he successfully negotiates a sale for more 
than the net amount. It would be absurd to hold that de-
fendant may recover a commission on concluding a sale for 
$2500 when none would be due her had she found a purchaser 
for $3,000. ' 
[7] The question remains whether the award of exem-
plary damages is proper. The right to recover punitive or 
exemplary damages is created by section 3294 of the Civil 
Code which provides that "In an action for the breach of an 
obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant 
has been guilty. of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or 
implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may 
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of pun-
ishing the defendant." (See Fitzpatrick v. Clark, 26 Cal. 
App. (2d) 710 [80 Pac. (2d) 183].) Under this section ex-
emplary damages may not be recovered in an action based 
upon a contractual obligation even though the breach of con-
tract is wilful or malicious. (Berning v. Colodny & Colodny, 
103 Cal. App. 188 [284 Pac. 496] ; Baumgarten v. Alliance 
Assurance Co., 159 Fed. 275; see 8 Cal. Jur. 872.) If on the 
other hand the action is one in tort, exemplary damages may 
be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud or op-
pression even though the tort incidentally involves a breach 
of contract. (Gorman v. Southern Pac. Co., 97 Cal. 1 [31 Pac. 
1112, 33 Am. St. Rep. 157] ; Lyles v. Perrin, 119 Cal. 264 
[51 Pac. 332] ; Jone.') v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251 [280 Pac. 942] ; 
Berning v. Colodny, supra.) 
The first cause of action set forth by plaintiff is one for 
money had and received. Since it is established in California 
that an action for money had and received is ex contractu in 
nature, being founded upon a promise implied in law (Phil-
pott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. (2d) 512 [36 Pac. (2d) 635, 
95 A. L. R. 990] ; McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. (2d) 527 
[36 Pac. (2d) 642, 95 A. L. R. 1019] ; Los Angeles, Drug Co. 
v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. (2d) 71 [63 Pac. (2d) 1124]; see 
Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 69 
Fed. (2d) 131) there is a question whether exemplary dam-
ages can be recovered in such an action. 
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[8] The second cause of action set forth by plaintiffs, 
however, contains the essential elements of an action for corl-
version and is therefore ex delicto in nature. Exemplary 
damages are properly awardable in an action for conversion, 
given the required showing of malice, fraud or oppression. 
(Arzaga v. Villalba, 85 Cal. 191 [24 Pac. 656];, Gilbert v. 
Peck, ] 62 Cal. 54 [121 Pac. 315, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1349.].) 
[9, 10] This count in brief alleges . that defendant, while 
acting as agent for plaintiffs, received a stipulated sumo'f 
money belonging to plaintiffs and refused to' account for it 
after a proper demand. Defendant contends tJIat a ,conyer,-
sion of the money is not sufnciently:alleged. The more re-
cent cases, however, indicate that a complaint, charging de-
fendant with exercising dominion over property inconsistent 
with the ownership of plaintiff sets forth a good cause, of 
action for conversion· where no special demurrer for uncer-
tainty is interposed. (Faulkner v. First National Bank, 130 
Cal. 258 [62 Pac. 463] ; Dieterle v. Bekin, 143 Cal. 683 [77 
Pac. 664J ; Gustafson v. Byers, 105 Cal. App.' 584 [288 Pac. 
111] ; First National Bank of Long Beach v. Crown T. & S. 
Co., 89 Cal. App. 243 [264 Pac. 534].) 
~ [11] A broker or agent is ordinarily liable for converting 
the funds of his principal when he refuses to account for 
them upon proper demand. (Wood v. Blaney, '107 Cal. 291 
[40 Pac. 428J ; Bellus v. Peters, 165 Cal. 112 [130 Pac. 1186] ; 
'stacy v. Browne, 99 Okla~ 104 [219 Pac. 336]; Jones v. 
Smith, 65 Misc. 528 [120 N. Y. Supp. 865] ; see 3 C. J. S. 19.) 
[12] While it is true that money cannot be the subject'of an 
action for conversion unless a specific sum capable of identi-
fication is involved (Baxter v. King, 81 Cal. App. 192 [253 
Pac. 172] ), it is not necessary that each coin or bill be ear-
marked. When an agent is required to turn over to his prin-
cipal a dennite sum received by him on his principal's ac-
count, the remedy of conversion is proper. (Salem Light & 
Traction' Co. v. Anson, 41 Ore. 562 [67 Pac. 1015, 69 Pac. 
675] .) 
[13] The trial court found, in accordance with the al. 
1egations set forth in the second cause of action. The evi-
dence is sufficient to show a conversion and to justify the 
court in concluding that defendant's refusal to account for 
the sum withheld by her was not made in good faith under an 
honest belief that she was entitled thereto, but was the re-
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sult of a fraudulent scheme to secure plaintiffs' money by 
:rneans'of trickery and deliberate falsehood. Such action con-
stitutes "oppression, fraud, or malice" within the meaning 
of section' 3294 of the Civil Code. 
Defendant complains that the judgment is erroneous in 
awarding plaintiffs the full amount of $3408.35, whereas in 
fact $225~.35, of such sum was paid to plaintiffs before the 
trial. Any supposed error in the judgment in this respect is 
in no way prejudicial to defendant. She makes no contention 
that she will be subjected to double payment, and such a pos-
sibility is precluded by the recital on the margin of the judg-
ment acknowledging a partial satisfaction of the judgment 
in the sum of $2258.35. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October 
30, 1941.] 
[L. A. No. 17914. InBank.-Oct. 1, 1941.] 
PAUL PEARLIN, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys at Law-Disbarment-Misconduct Toward Client 
-Commingling of Funds.-An attorney who commingled his 
elient's funds with his own and spent them to impress a 
prospective client, not as the result of inexperience or in-
advertence, but with full cognizance of the impropriety of his 
acts, and who had been previously reproved for a similar 
act, is properly disbarred. 
[2] Id.-Disbar'ment-Defenses-Restitution of MoneY.-An at-
torney is not entitled to any indulgence by reason of the 
restitution of moneys wrongfully retained where such resti-
tution is made aftflr report of his action to The State Bar. 
1. See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 411; 5 Am. Jur. 423. 
MeK. Dig. References: 1. Attorneys at Law, § 140; 2. Attorneys' 
at Law, § 15L ' 
.., 
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PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of the Board 
of Governors of The State Bar that petitioner be disbarred. 
Petitioner disbarred. ' 
Paul Pearlin, in pro. per., for Petitioner. 
W. Eugene Craven for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-Petitioner was cited to appear before a 
local administrative committee of The State Bar and to show 
cause why he should not be disciplined for professional mis-
conduct growing out of the alleged violation of his oath and 
duties as an attorney and the commission of acts involving 
moral turpitude within the meaning of sections 6103 and 6106 
of the State Bar Act. At the conclusion of its hearing, the 
local committee made findings of fact and recommended dis-
barment. The Board of Governors adopted the findings and 
has recommended to this court that petitioner be disbarred 
from the practice of the law. Petitioner does not challenge 
the findings or the sufficiency of the evidence to support them. 
In his petition he states that this court "in fair justice to 
the state and the complainant could not overlook the gravity 
of the offense of the petitioner" but he urges that disbar-
ment is "harsh and oppressive" and that" a period of sus-
pension would be sufficient." 
[1] At the hearing before the committee petitioner frankly 
admitted that he had deliberately commingled the funds of 
a client with those of his own and had deliberately, and not 
ina,dvertently, expended the same at night clubs and, bars in 
an effort, he states, to impress a third person whom he then 
regarded as a prospective client. The funds so improperly 
commingled and expended represented the proceeds of a 
draft in the amount of $130 payable to the client for dam-
ages to her automobile and by her endorsed in blank to peti-
tioner to be used by him for the express purpose of pur-
chasing a new automobile for said client. The money was 
repaid by petitioner only after the client had reported his 
action to The State Bar. 
In addition to confessing freely his misconduct, petitioner 
also admitted his familiarity at the time with the rules of 
professional ethics which prohibit the commingling and misuse 
of a client's funds. He stated to the committee that "I don't 
